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We give a deﬁnition of human uncertainty through subjective likelihood estimates. The
subject is asked for his estimated likelihood of diﬀerent statements, given a present piece of
observation. With this interpretation of human uncertainty, we are able to perform consistent
inference about our target variables, by formally treating the input as likelihood factors. By
focusing on likelihood estimates given the present observation only, we eliminate the problem
of handling the subjects overall judgement. The algorithm has been successfully implemented
in an expert system for classiﬁcation of wildwood mushrooms.
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People frequently make statements like: ‘‘Im 90% sure that the taxi driver spoke
Swedish in his cell phone.’’ The purpose of the present article is to give a probabilis-
tic interpretation of statements of this type, so that we can combine them, and pro-
duce consistent inference.0888-613X/$ - see front matter  2004 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.
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statement, he is right 90% of the times. This makes some sense when there are only
two alternatives, if we assume symmetry in his errors, so that his 10% error rate
applies whether the driver actually speaks Swedish or not. However, we would like
to generalize our interpretation to cases with more than two possible answers.
Suppose our subject estimates the taxi drivers language to be ‘‘90% Swedish, 5%
Norwegian, 3% Danish and 2% Icelandic’’. Then the error rate interpretation fails
to make sense.
The article is laid out as follows: ﬁrst we review diﬀerent established models of
human uncertainty. Then we deﬁne our model of subjective likelihoods and give a
Bayesian inference rule for combining statements. Then we describe an application
of the algorithm in an expert system that helps a user classify wildwood mushrooms.
The last section concludes the article.2. Established models of human uncertainty
In this section we give a broad overview of models that have been used for quan-
tifying human uncertainty.
2.1. Certainty factors
In the early days of artiﬁcial intelligence, expert systems were built that were imi-
tating human inference [9]. The typical expert system consisted of a set of facts, a set
of rules, and an inference engine. The inference engine applied a sequence of rules to
the set of facts, thereby producing new facts. Uncertainty was modelled through cer-
tainty factors associated to facts and rules. Although some expert systems of this
kind worked quite well, certainty factors are not popular nowadays, because they
tend to produce contradictions [7].
In our Swedish example, assume that the person may possibly be speaking Nor-
wegian, which sounds very similar to Swedish for non-Scandinavians. If a certainty
factor based expert system were presented with the fact that the driver was from
Norway, it would increase its certainty for the language sounding Swedish. The sys-
tem would treat this as evidence in favour of the language being Swedish. This prob-
lem is known as certainty factors inability of ‘‘explaining away’’ [7].2.2. Fuzzy logic
Fuzzy logic attempts to model uncertainty through vagueness, rather than prob-
abilities. In a fuzzy logic context, our taxi driver example statement would be inter-
preted as ‘‘On a swedishness scale from 0 to 100, the taxi drivers language was 90.’’
This is an interesting and useful semantic model in many cases, but our goal is to
model the fact that the subjects observation may be wrong, not that he is correct
to a certain degree. For a discussions on how fuzzy logic relates to probability the-
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fuzzy sets are made in [3].
2.3. Dempster–Schaefer theory
In Dempster–Schafer theory, uncertainty is modelled by an interval (a,b)  [0, 1]
[8]. The idea is that the span of the interval reﬂects the degree of uncertainty. One
might e.g. assign [0,1] to a statement of extra terrestrial intelligent life, while the
event that the future ﬂipping of a fair coin gives ‘‘heads’’, would have a collapsed
interval {0.5}. The theory gives a consistent calculus for combining statements. It
is not readily applicable to our setting, though, because our subject does not convey
his uncertainty in the form of intervals.
2.4. Lower previsions
The theory of lower (and upper) previsions can be seen as a generalization of
Dempster–Schafer theory [10]. The lower prevision of a statement can be interpreted
as a lower limit of the probability of the statement being true. The theory is related to
gambling situations where one assumes that the opponent may have more informa-
tion than oneself. As an example, you might assign a 0.4 lower prevision on the event
that the ﬂipping of a coin gives ‘‘heads’’, if you suspect that the coin may be unfair,
but you are sure that even an unfair coin will give heads at least 40% of the time. The
theory is by nature pessimistic, as it always works through worst-case values of prob-
abilities. This is good for the purpose of making robust inference, but does not cap-
ture the meaning of out taxi driver example statement.
2.5. Subjective probability
A natural interpretation of our example statement is that the subjects subjective
probability of the drivers conversation being in Swedish is 0.9. The term subjective
probability (as opposed to frequency based probability) means that the subject
merely assigns numbers to diﬀerent events and statements, which obey the rules of
probability calculus.
A problem with subjective probabilities is that one cannot easily combine diﬀerent
subjective probability statements in a meaningful way, because the statement is de-
rived from the subjects internal probability model. Suppose we want to combine the
given statement with the fact that the event took place in Sweden, we would ﬁrst
need to know whether the subject had already included this important piece of infor-
mation in his 0.9 probability estimate.
Also, it is very hard for people to produce consistent subjective probabilities in
cases where they simply do not know. The attempt of assigning uniform probabilities
to reﬂect ignorance often fails, and the question of extra terrestrial intelligent life is a
good example: if you assign a 0.5 probability of extra terrestrial intelligent life in our
galaxy, you cannot readily assign the same probability for the left arm of the galaxy,
or for entire universe. The diﬃculty in representing ignorance in a consistent way is a
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2.6. Bayesian networks
In a Bayesian network [4], nodes represent random variables, which are connected
through edges that represent causal relations. When new evidence is presented, prob-
abilities are propagated through the network in a consistent way.
Bayesian networks represent a diﬀerent perspective than that of classical expert
systems: rather than imitating the human thought process, with uncertainty associ-
ated to inference rules, one creates a consistent causal probability model, and uses
probability calculus for inference. Under this paradigm, certain and uncertain hu-
man knowledge is included in the model of the world, rather than in the automatic
reasoning. Hence, Bayesian network modelling does not oﬀer any immediate inter-
pretation of our taxi driver statement, but it gives a framework within which we
would like our interpretation to ﬁt.3. Subjective likelihood
Our interpretation of the taxi-driver statement, which we introduce in this article,
is this: ‘‘The probability of me hearing what I heard, if he did speak Swedish, is nine
times higher than the probability of me hearing what I heard if he didnt speak
Swedish.’’
With this interpretation, the statement only refers to the present observation, not
the subjects overall judgment concerning the drivers language. By only referring to
the subjects present observation, and not to his personal beliefs about the probabil-
ity of meeting Swedish-speaking people in this given situation, the statement is made
context free. This enables us to use it in a formal probabilistic Bayesian model, and
combining it with other statements, without worrying about the statements context.
Now assume that the subject is in Sweden, where the a priori probability of a taxi
driver speaking Swedish on the phone is, say, 95%. Then the likelihood of the con-
versation having been in Swedish is the prior probability of 0.95 multiplied by the
observation weight 0.9, while the likelihood of the opposite is 0.05 times 0.1. This
gives
P ½Conversation in Swedish ¼ 0:95 0:9
0:95 0:9þ 0:05 0:1  0:994
This high estimate is reasonable, because the conversation both sounded Swedish to
the subject, and took place in Sweden.
We formalize this calculation for observations with n diﬀerent values. Let
h 2 H = {h1,h2, . . . ,hn} be the true state of Nature, and let the prior distribution p
be a probability vector of length n, so that pi = P(hi). Let {o1,o2, . . . ,on} be a vector
of random variables with values in some space X. We interpret X as the set of pos-
sible observations that the subject can make, and the random variable oi represents
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subject has made observation x. We can then calculate the conditional distribution
(pjx) using Bayes formula:
ðpjxÞi ¼ P ðhijxÞ ¼
P ðhiÞP ðxjhiÞPn
j¼1PðhjÞP ðxjhjÞ
¼ piP ðoi ¼ xÞPn
j¼1pjP ðoj ¼ xÞ
ð1Þ
In this formula, we use the standard statistical convention of interpreting P(oi = x) as
a probability if the ois are discrete variables, and as probability density (likelihood)
otherwise. (In theory, one should link this to the structure of the observation space
X, but we will return to this below.)
So far, our construction is one of standard Bayesian inference. The next step in an
applied Bayesian analysis would usually be to collect data (x), and compute (pjx),
treating the distributions of the ois as given. Our approach is simpler mathemati-
cally, as we leave the assessment of o, x and X to the subject. We deﬁne the subjective
likelihood vector of observation x 2 X by
q ¼ ½P ðo1 ¼ xÞ; Pðo2 ¼ xÞ; . . . ; P ðon ¼ xÞ ð2Þ
Again, we either treat P(oi = x) as a probability or a probability density. Note that
the observation x and the random variables oi are ‘‘private’’ for the subject, which is
the reason why we can disregard the mathematical structure of the domain X. For
our purpose, a rescaling of the vector q is also of no importance, as only the compo-
nents relative values aﬀect our computation below.
In a sense, we condition p by the vector q (which is what our subject reports), so
write (pjq) instead of (pjx). This is a slight abuse of notation, but we prefer to hide
the private variable x.
With our deﬁnitions, Eq. (1) now simpliﬁes to
ðpjqÞi ¼
piqiPn
j¼1pjqj
ð3Þ
If the denominator is zero, the observation contradicts p, in which case we deﬁne
pjq = p, for convenience.
Observe that if qk = 1 for some k, in which case q represents certainty, then (3)
implies pjq = q, provided the denominator is nonzero (i.e. pk > 0). On the other hand,
if is uniform, in which case q represents complete ignorance, then pjq = p.
The (normalized) subjective likelihood vector also has a diﬀerent but equivalent
interpretation: imagine that the subject happened to have a uniform prior probabil-
ity distribution vector p ¼ 1n ½1; 1; . . . ; 1, and that we asked him for his subjective
probability vector ~p given his observation: ~p ¼ pjx. We easily see that ~p elicited in this
way is equal (up to multiplication with a constant) to q deﬁned by (2). Therefore, our
subjective likelihood vector may alternatively be deﬁned as hypothetical posterior dis-
tribution under a uniform prior. This deﬁnition may be useful for explaining to the
subject how to respond, and emphasizes the fact that he should disregard any prior
information regarding the probabilities of h.
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We now proceed to the more complex case with an underlying model.
Again, let the true state of Nature be h 2 {h1,h2, . . . ,hn} with a prior distribution
vector p. We also have a set of m features: {F1,F2, . . . ,Fm}. Each feature Fj has a do-
main of nj feature values: fmj1; mj2; . . . ; mjnjg. For each hi, we have a probability distri-
bution P hi ¼ P i over
Qm
j¼1f1; 2; . . . ; njg. We use the compact notation P iðj; kÞ ¼
P ðF j ¼ mjkjhiÞ, where 1 6 j 6 m and 1 6 k 6 nj. Hence, each state of nature hi gives
a probability vector Pi(j, Æ ) over the nj diﬀerent values, for each feature j. We assume
that the m feature distributions of Pi are independent.
Let qj be a subjective likelihood vector for feature j. Just like in the previous sec-
tion, this means that there exist random variables foj1; oj2; . . . ; ojnjg (corresponding to
the nj diﬀerent values for feature j), with values in some space X, such that
qj ¼ ½P ðoj1 ¼ xÞ; P ðoj2 ¼ xÞ; . . . ; P ðojnj ¼ xÞ. Again, we need not worry about what X
and the distributions of oji look like, because our subject supplies us with q
j directly.
Then the distribution of p conditioned by x, through qj, is given by
ðpjqjÞi ¼
pi
Pnj
k¼1P iðj; kÞqjkPm
l¼1pl
Pnj
k¼1P lðj; kÞqjk
ð4Þ
Here too, we disregard the subjective likelihood vector, if it contradicts p:
If
Xm
l¼1
pl
Xnj
k¼1
Plðj; kÞqjk ¼ 0; then ðpjqjÞ ¼ p:
Observe that if qj is uniform, then pjqj = p. Again, this means that a uniform subjec-
tive likelihood successfully represents complete ignorance, because conditioning by it
makes no diﬀerence. The intuition behind this is clear: a uniform subjective likeli-
hood means that the subject reports that his observation is equally likely for each
possible feature value.
If qjk ¼ 1 for some k, then qj represents certainty. In this case, (4) simpliﬁes to
standard conditioning: ðpjqjÞi ¼ PðhijF j ¼ mjkÞ, which is what we want.
The following simple proposition states that the order in which we condition by
subjective likelihood vectors makes no diﬀerence. We apply an abbreviated inner
product notation: hP i; qji ¼
Pnj
k¼1P iðj; kÞqjk.
Proposition 1. Let j;j 2 f1; 2; . . . ;mg, and let qj and qj be corresponding subjective
likelihood vectors that do not contradict the prior p. Then we have
ððpjqjÞjqjÞi ¼ ððpjqjÞjqjÞi ¼
pihP i; qjihP i; qjiPm
l¼1plhP l; qjihP l; qji
:
The result is a trivial consequence of Bayesian inference theory [6], but for readers
unfamiliar with this, we give a direct proof.
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ððpjqjÞjqjÞi ¼
ðpjqjÞihP i; qjiPm
l¼1ðpjqjÞlhPl; qji
¼
pihP i; qjiPm
l¼1plhP l; qji
hP i; qji
Pm
l¼1
plhP l; qjiPm
ll¼1pllhPll; qji
hPl; qji
¼
Pm
ll¼1ðpllhP ll; qjiÞpihP i; qjihP i; qjiPm
l¼1ðplhP l; qjiÞ
Pm
l¼1plhPl; qjihPl; qji
¼ pihP i; q
jihP i; qjiPm
l¼1plhP l; qjihP l; qji
:The result follows because this expression is symmetric in qj and qj. h
4. Mushroom application
We now give an application in the domain of mushroom classiﬁcation. The setting
is this: the subject has found a mushroom in the woods, and needs help in determin-
ing to which species it belongs.4.1. The model
Each hi corresponds to a species (or in some cases a union of similar species). The
prior probability distribution p over the hs corresponds to how frequent the diﬀer-
ent species are in the woods. Features are observable properties of mushrooms. An
example is ‘‘Color of the cap’’, with a given listing of colors, as its value set. Other
features, such as ‘‘Has white spots on the cap’’ have the binary value set of ‘‘yes’’
and ‘‘no’’.
Each species has a given probability distribution for each feature, which rep-
resent its variability. As an example, the well-known Fly Agaric (amanita musc-
aria) very often has white spots on the cap, but not always. Therefore,
P(yes) = 0.95 and P(no) = 0.05 is a reasonable distribution for the feature ‘‘Has
white spots on the cap’’. The main color of the cap may also vary; a reasonable
distribution is P(red) = 0.7, P(orange) = 0.2, and P(yellow) = 0.1. Also, it nor-
mally has a collar on the stalk, but it sometimes falls oﬀ, and P(yes) = 0.9 and
P(no) = 0.1 is our distribution of the feature ‘‘Has collar on the stalk’’ for the
Fly Agaric. Currently the implementation includes about 100 diﬀerent species
and 20 features.
In order to handle otherwise contradictive evidence, we have also deﬁned a ‘‘de-
fault species’’ with uniform distribution for all features, and low prior probability.
When the computation gives a high probability to this ‘‘species’’, it either means that
the mushroom in question is of a species not included in the model, or the user has
made incorrect observations.
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So far we have focused on calculations used for updating the probability distribu-
tion over species, given input from the user. A diﬀerent problem is the order in which
the system asks its questions. For this problem of feature choice, we have imple-
mented an optimization algorithm, which seeks to minimize the expected posterior
total variance.
We deﬁne the total variance of a probability distribution p by V ðpÞ ¼Pn
i¼1pið1 piÞ. The minimum value of V is zero, which is realized if and only if p
places all probability on one species.
Assume that the system chooses feature j. The current probability distribution p
generates a distribution f over the nj diﬀerent feature values:
fk ¼
Pn
i¼1piP iðj; kÞPnj
k0¼1
Pn
i¼1piP iðj; k0Þ
:
For the purpose of feature choice, we assume that the user is able to observe the
feature j without uncertainty, so that his subjective likelihood vector qj will be a unit
vector with weight 1 on component k^, denoted by ek^. Under this assumption, the dis-
tribution of k^ is given by f above. Now we can calculate the expected total variance
after conditioning by the users response to feature j: E½V ðpjqjÞ ¼Pnjk¼1fkV ðpjekÞ.
The chosen feature is the one minimizing the posterior expected total variance:
j* = argminjE[V(pjqj)] (with some arbitrary rule for breaking ties).
The following proposition states that the total expected variance cannot increase
by posing question j.Proposition 2. E[V(pjqj)] 6 V(p).Proof. Due to the linearity of the expectancy, it suﬃces to show
E½ðpijk^Þð1 pijk^Þ 6 pið1 piÞ. The result follows from Jensens inequality [2],
because E½pijk^ ¼ pi and p(1  p) is concave in p. h
This property is rather important from a practical point of view. We have exper-
imented with other objective functions than V, which appear intuitively reasonable,
such as the probability of the most probable species, negated. This often works ﬁne,
but in some cases it asks completely irrelevant questions, that oﬀer no information,
because the relevant questions give an expected increase in the objective function.
Hence the program avoids the critical questions, for fear of what it might discover.
Proposition 2 guarantees that this will not happen with the objective function V.
4.3. User interface issues
It turns out to be impractical for a user to assign numbers to his uncertain obser-
vations. We have therefore implemented a user interface where he checks the diﬀer-
ent values he considers possible, in descending order of likelihood. We assign a
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course, is not the only reasonable choice, but it appears to capture human uncer-
tainty reasonably well. The user may choose not to check any values, which gives
the uniform distribution (or equivalently: passes the question).
4.4. Experience
The system has been tested by more than 10 people, ranging from beginners to
experts in the Norwegian mushroom community. Over all, the system works very
well, as even complete novices in the area of mushroom classiﬁcation have classiﬁed
a broad range of mushrooms successfully with the support of our system. A big
improvement in performance came when we included sample pictures of feature val-
ues, rather than mere text descriptions.
4.5. Practical problems
The biggest practical problem we encountered was convincing the subjects to re-
port their uncertainty by checking more than one feature value, particularly for yes/
no questions. People ﬁnd it easier to describe a color as ‘‘most likely beige, but pos-
sibly brown, grey or white’’ than to answer both ‘‘yes’’ and ‘‘no’’ to a question.
4.6. Problems of uncertainty interpretation
We have not found it necessary to explain the exact interpretation of subjective
likelihood vectors to our test subjects. However, if the subject has prior experience
with mushroom classiﬁcation, he may start by making up his mind about which spe-
cies the present mushroom belongs to, and then bias his responses toward what he
knows to be typical features values for that species. This is a problem of separating
observation and judgement, which one gets with the use of subjective probabilities,
and which we try to avoid with subjective likelihoods. It is therefore important to
instruct the subject to observe each feature individually, and leave the overall judge-
ment to the program. Fortunately, this is only a real problem for subjects that do not
need the expert system support.
4.7. Dependency problems
Our calculation scheme relies on independence of the diﬀerent features for each
species. This has given some problems.
We have mentioned the binary feature ‘‘Has a collar on the stalk’’. A few species
of the amanita family have a collar with clearly visible stripes. In order to distinguish
the edible Blusher (Amanita rubescens) from poisonous amanita species, we therefore
included the binary feature ‘‘Has collar with stripes’’. Clearly, a mushroom with
striped collar has a collar, so these features are not independent, which may cause
problems. Suppose the user reports that that his mushroom has a collar, with 75%
certainty, and then reports that it has a striped collar, also with 75% certainty.
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both of the collar related observations appear to count in their favour. A good solu-
tion to this problem would be to merge these two features into one: ‘‘Has collar on
the stalk’’ with values ‘‘no’’, ‘‘yes, without stripes’’, and ‘‘yes, with stripes’’.
A diﬀerent dependence problem arose with the Cantrell (Cantharellus cibarius)
species. We use three diﬀerent features for the color of a mushroom: its color on
the cap, underneath the cap, and on the stalk. The Cantrell is normally yellow,
but it may vary from whitish to orange. However, it invariably has the same color
all over, so the independence assumption fails for the three color-related features.
This is best solved by splitting the species into diﬀerent variants, each with the same
color all over.
These dependency problems are mainly of academic interest, as they do not ap-
pear to aﬀect the frequency of misclassiﬁcations signiﬁcantly.4.8. Robustness
It turns out that users tend to underreport their uncertainty, and sometimes miss
an obviously correct answer. This may be because they misread or misunderstand the
question, or even accidentally check the wrong box. If this happens even once, and
the correct species has zero probability for the given feature value, it will eliminate
the correct species completely.
Fortunately, the systems contains more than suﬃcient information to distinguish
between its set of species, and this gives us the possibility of trading some accuracy
for robustness. We do this by assigning a small ‘‘background noise’’ likelihood
weight to feature values that the user does not report. We also in general deﬁne
the feature distributions slightly more variable than we believe to be the case.4.9. Subjective likelihood vs. subjective probability
In our deﬁnition of subjective likelihood we deliberately eliminate the subjects
own assessment of probabilities regarding the actual state of the world. We do this,
because we want to make automatic inference, by combining several uncertain state-
ments made by the subject. If we instead ask for the subjects subjective probabilities,
combining these directly would reinforce his prior beliefs, an error source that is
hard to eliminate.
Hence, the upside of using subjective likelihood estimates is that we can combine
them in a consistent way. The downside is that we lose potentially valuable informa-
tion. In situations where the subject has excellent domain knowledge with a good
subjective probability model himself, and you can only ask him a few questions,
the value of his expert opinion is likely to dominate the problem of combining his
statements in a formal way. In the mushroom classiﬁcation case, this means that
if your subject is a trained mycologist, and you can only ask him a few questions,
you would do better by simply asking him to name the samples you are showing
him, and take his word for it.
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We conclude that our interpretation of uncertainty in human observation through
subjective likelihood estimates is successful. It appears to capture human semantic in
a reasonable way, and in particular models complete ignorance successfully. Our
interpretation also has the advantage of being ﬁrmly rooted in Bayesian statistics.
Our application to Mushroom classiﬁcation conﬁrms the methods practical use-
fulness. In order to make the system more robust we have added a small baseline
likelihood, even in cases where the user reports no uncertainty.
In our opinion, our inference model combines the ‘‘modern expert system ap-
proach’’ of building formally sound probabilistic models of the world, with the
‘‘classical expert system approach’’ of modelling human uncertainty explicitly.References
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